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ORIGINALISM:  A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 
Keith E. Whittington* 
 
The theory of originalism is now well into its second wave. Originalism 
first came to prominence in the 1970s and 1980s as conservative critics 
reacted to the decisions of the Warren Court, and the Reagan 
Administration embraced originalism as a check on judicial activism.  A 
second wave of originalism has emerged since the late 1990s, responding to 
earlier criticisms and reconsidering earlier assumptions and conclusions.  
This Article assesses where originalist theory currently stands.  It outlines 
the points of agreement and disagreement within the recent originalist 
literature and highlights the primary areas of continuing separation 
between originalists and their critics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Originalism as an approach to constitutional interpretation and a guide to 
the exercise of judicial review enjoyed its greatest prominence in the 1980s.  
The Reagan Administration invited public debate over judicial philosophy, 
and the Administration controversially committed itself to the search for 
 
*  William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University.  I thank Larry 
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original meaning as the correct approach to construing the Constitution.1  
Attorney General Edwin Meese, Judge Robert Bork, and then-Judge 
Antonin Scalia became the high-profile advocates for originalism.2  The 
Federalist Society was founded, and promoted the “great debate” over 
originalism between such figures as Meese and Bork on the one hand, and 
Justices William Brennan and John Paul Stevens on the other.3  Given this 
history, it is no surprise that concerns about originalism were a prominent 
theme in the debate over the nomination of Robert Bork to the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1987.4 
The Reagan era was also a time for active academic debate over the 
intellectual merits of originalism.  By the time Robert Bork5 and Antonin 
Scalia6 published their book-length defenses of originalism, their views 
were both familiar and well mooted in the literature.  The political salience 
of originalism undoubtedly boosted academic interest in the theory, but the 
period was also a fertile time for such theoretical debates.7  Scholarly 
debates revolved around competing “grand constitutional theories” 
concerned with justifying and guiding the exercise of judicial review.8  
Raoul Berger’s Government by Judiciary,9 backed by his aggressive 
defense of its theoretical premises in law review articles,10 fit right in with 
John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust11 and Ronald Dworkin’s A Matter 
of Principle.12 
Originalist theory has continued to develop and grow in the intervening 
years, even if the Bork nomination continues to define the image of 
originalism for many.  Paul Brest launched the 1980s with an influential 
article bemoaning the “misconceived quest for the original understanding” 
 
 1. See generally JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 
133–60 (2007). 
 2. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(1984); Edwin Meese III, U.S. Attorney Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association 
(July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE:  INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1, 1 
(Paul G. Cassel ed., 1986); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 
849 (1988). 
 3. See generally THE GREAT DEBATE:  INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 2. 
 4. O’NEILL, supra note 1, at 170–75. 
 5. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990). 
 6. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997). 
 7. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 132–64 (1996) 
(describing how the originalism debate fit into other trends in normative constitutional 
theory). 
 8. See MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE 1 (1988); see also Keith E. Whittington, 
Herbert Wechsler’s Complaint and the Revival of Grand Constitutional Theory, 34 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 509, 509–10 (2000). 
 9. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). 
 10. See O’NEILL, supra note 1, at 111–32. 
 11. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980). 
 12. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). 
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of the Constitution.13  Daniel Farber closed the decade with a “guide for the 
perplexed” to the originalism debate.14  With the rise of a “new 
originalism,”15 it is perhaps time for a new brief “tourist guide”16 that 
outlines some of the key features of originalism as it stands today.  As 
originalist arguments have proliferated and deepened, some have 
questioned whether there is anything distinctive left to the label.17  
Certainly the old familiar standards may no longer be the best touchstones 
for discussing modern originalism. 
This Article provides a critical guide to the current state of originalist 
theory.18  Part I focuses on some key points of general agreement among 
originalist theorists,19 while Part II identifies some key points of contention 
among originalists about originalist theory.  Part III focuses on some central 
points of continuing separation between originalists and their critics. 
I.  POINTS OF AGREEMENT 
Before examining some of the more interesting points of agreement 
among current originalists, it would be useful to clarify what I mean by 
originalism.  At its most basic, originalism argues that the discoverable 
public meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption should 
be regarded as authoritative for purposes of later constitutional 
interpretation.20  The text of the Constitution itself, including its structural 
design, is a primary source of that public meaning, but extrinsic sources of 
specifically historical information might also elucidate the principles 
embodied in the text of the Constitution.21  Each textual provision must 
 
 13. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204 (1980). 
 14. Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate:  A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1085 (1989). 
 15. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 
(1999); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004).  
Or, in Ken Kersch’s helpful terms, the development of a “proactive originalism,” to be 
contrasted to the “reactive originalism” of the 1970s and 1980s. See Ken I. Kersch, 
Ecumenicalism Through Constitutionalism:  The Discursive Development of Constitutional 
Conservatism in National Review, 1955–1980, 25 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 86, 103 (2011). 
 16. Farber, supra note 14, at 1085. 
 17. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009). 
 18. Unlike Farber, I am not concerned in this Article with reviewing the entire 
originalism debate.  This Article concentrates on just one side of the debate and is intended 
to provide a brief, accessible introduction to modern originalism.  At the same time, this 
Article does not attempt to inventory all the recent work on originalism.  I identify what I 
take to be some major themes in the current literature on originalism, but I do not pursue 
other features that can no doubt be found in the literature, and I do not marshal systematic 
evidence to support my particular conclusions about the current contours of the literature. 
 19. The level of agreement is never, of course, complete, even on these central points.  
Unsurprisingly, some still prefer that old-time religion and remain a bit puzzled by the 
apparent shift. See Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of 
Law, San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-028, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1150447. 
 20. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 35 (1999); 
Whittington, supra note 15, at 599. 
 21. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 35. 
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necessarily bear the meaning attributed to it at the time of its own adoption.  
Later constitutional amendments stand separately from the original 
Constitution, reflecting different purposes, understandings, and debates.22 
The two crucial components of originalism are the claims that 
constitutional meaning was fixed at the time of the textual adoption and that 
the discoverable historical meaning of the constitutional text has legal 
significance and is authoritative in most circumstances.  Lawrence Solum 
has called the first claim the “fixation thesis.”  In his terms, the “semantic 
meaning” of the text was “fixed” at the time it was written and formally 
adopted.23  The semantic content of a word or phrase may drift over time, 
but the fixation thesis contends that the proper meaning of a word within a 
particular document is the one that was meant at the time of the document’s 
creation, rather than alternative meanings that might have emerged later or 
been in use earlier.24  Solum has called the second claim the “contribution 
thesis”—the idea that “the linguistic meaning of the Constitution constrains 
the content of constitutional doctrine.”25  Historical meaning might 
“contribute” to or constrain the development of legal doctrine for reasons 
internal to our particular legal culture and its commitments to, and 
understandings of, the rule of law, or for reasons external to our legal 
system that appeal to a normatively compelling political theory.26  As we 
shall see, there is space for disagreement over such questions of how best to 
justify the contribution thesis or how strongly the contribution thesis ought 
to be framed (i.e., how much should original meaning constrain legal 
doctrine?), but these two components—that the meaning of the text is 
historically fixed and that the historical meaning constrains legal 
meaning—are at the heart of originalist theory. 
A.  Original Meaning 
The terms of the debate have shifted somewhat over time, from talking 
about “original intent” to talking about “original meaning.”  The turn to 
 
 22. Thus, it is possible, for example, for the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to have a different original meaning than the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  Within this paper, I use “Founding” generally as the point of historical interest 
for originalism, but strictly speaking the examination of the meaning of any given piece of 
constitutional text would be centrally interested in the period of that text’s adoption. 
 23. Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 923, 944 (2009).  I express some caution about the turn to “semantics” in Keith E. 
Whittington, Dworkin’s ‘Originalism’:  The Role of Intentions in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197, 207–16 (2000).  Ultimately Solum’s approach to “semantic 
originalism” comes closer to mirroring the practice of searching for illocutionary intent than 
Dworkin’s abstracted and normatively infused “semantic intentions.” 
 24. Solum, supra note 23, at 944–46. 
 25. Id. at 954. 
 26. Id.; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 49, 61, 110–13.  Just how constraining 
original meaning might be on the content of constitutional law is also left ambiguous by 
Solum.  As the name of the thesis implies, Solum primarily argues that original meaning 
“contributes” to “the legal content of constitutional law.” Solum, supra note 23, at 954.  He 
at least leaves open the possibility that the contribution is not complete and that the original 
meaning of the constitutional text and the legal content of constitutional law will not be 
identical. 
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original meaning reflects some theoretical and practical adjustments in 
emphasis within the literature on originalism. 
1.  Original Meaning and Original Intent 
The first point of substantial agreement among modern originalists is an 
emphasis on original meaning of the constitutional text.  Justice Scalia has 
referred to this by the somewhat misleading label of “textualism.”27  By 
textualism, Scalia has in mind the “objectified intent” of the legislature—
what “a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed 
alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”28  Scalia clarifies that what the 
reasonable person should be gathering is the “original meaning of the 
text.”29 
There are alternative ideas about the definition of original meaning, but 
ultimately these different ways of framing the issue have little consequence.  
In the early stages of the debate, scholars were more likely to refer to the 
“original intent” than to the “original meaning.”  Thus, in his classic article 
advancing the idea of originalism, Robert Bork tended to refer to “framers’ 
intent.”30  At times, the reference to what “the framers actually . . . 
intended” could readily be understood as simply a loose way of talking 
about the combination of “text and history”31 or the “text, structure, and 
history of the Constitution”32—in other words, the kind of “objectified 
intent” that Scalia has emphasized.33  But at other times, original intent was 
clearly used to refer to subjective states of mind of individual Framers.34  
The slippage is understandable since the inquiry was almost always said to 
be one of discovering what they meant when creating this constitutional 
 
 27. SCALIA, supra note 6, at 23.  Even Brest suggests this linkage in his early critique of 
originalism, observing that his focus was on theories that emphasized “the interpretation of 
text and original history as distinguished, for example, from the interpretation of precedents 
and social values.” Brest, supra note 13, at 204 n.1. 
 28. SCALIA, supra note 6, at 17. 
 29. Id. at 38. 
 30. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 13 (1971). 
 31. Id. at 16–17; see also Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr.:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 55, 19 (1971) (statement of 
William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States, Office of Legal Counsel) 
(pledging to focus on “the use of the language used by the framers, the historical materials 
available,” and “the intent of the framers of the Constitution”). 
 32. Robert H. Bork, Original Intent:  The Only Legitimate Basis for Constitutional 
Decision Making, JUDGES J., Summer 1987, at 13, 15. 
 33. SCALIA, supra note 6. 
 34. See, e.g., Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re 
Speaking?”  Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
967 (2004); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional 
Adjudication:  Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).  But the 
distinctive significance of subjective intent for originalism was more often emphasized by 
critics than proponents of originalism, who in turn highlighted the complications associated 
with a pursuit of subjective intentions. See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE 
CONSTITUTION 10–16 (1986); Brest, supra note 13; H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern 
Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1987). 
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text.  What was “the meaning attached by the framers to the words they 
employed in the Constitution”?35 
Alternative ways of framing the theory appealed to “original public 
understanding” or “original public meaning.”  Although such language 
might also be used interchangeably, as Paul Brest did in his defining 
critique of this approach to constitutional interpretation,36 there is at least 
the potential for subtly distinguishing among them.  Henry Monaghan, for 
example, emphasized that the “relevant inquiry must focus on the public 
understanding of the language when the Constitution was developed.”37  
Quoting Alexander Hamilton, Monaghan pointed out that the “intention . . . 
to be sought” is “in the instrument itself.”38  How was the text received and 
understood by the people assembled in the state ratifying conventions?  
How would it have been understood by lawyers and jurists familiar with the 
“usual & established rules of construction”?39  Similarly, Gary Lawson 
characterized originalism, or “originalist textualism,” as “a method which 
searches for the ordinary public meanings that the Constitution’s words . . . 
had at the time of those words’ origins.”40  The interpreter’s goal was to 
find evidence that would help illuminate the “text’s original public 
meaning.”41  The implicit contrast was both with any current public 
meaning that might conflict with the historical meaning and with any 
original private meaning that might have been held by individual drafters. 
Originalist theory has now largely coalesced around original public 
meaning as the proper object of interpretive inquiry.  Although the 
terminology deployed can still vary, “originalism” or “original meaning” 
has now pretty clearly taken dominance over “original intent” as the 
preferred shorthand for this collection of theories.42  In part, original 
meaning better captures the primary orientation of even the early literature 
in the 1970s and 1980s, for which understanding “the Constitution 
according to the intention of those who conceived it” almost never meant 
 
 35. BERGER, supra note 9, at 363.  Similarly, in my initial writings on this subject, I used 
original intent and original meaning interchangeably, ultimately arguing that what mattered 
was the intent “embodied in the text.” WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 181. 
 36. Brest, supra note 13, at 204 (stating that originalism is the approach that “accords 
binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters” and 
advocates “[a]dherence to the text and original understanding”). 
 37. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 723, 725 (1988). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act To 
Establish a Bank, in 8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 111 (H. Syrett ed., 1965)); see 
also Scalia, supra note 2, at 854 (describing the Constitution as having “a fixed meaning 
ascertainable through the usual devices familiar to those learned in the law”). 
 40. Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 875 (1992). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Perhaps indicative of the transition is the shift in the historian (and critic of 
originalism) Jack Rakove’s books on the subject. Compare INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION:  THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990), with JACK 
N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1997). 
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“look[ing] inside for the truest account of their brain states at the moment 
that the texts were created.”43 
More substantively, the focus on original public meaning more clearly 
emphasizes two aspects of the originalist approach.  First, original meaning 
better captures the public authority of the text.  The Constitution as drafted 
and ratified is the supreme law of the land by virtue of its ratification and 
continued acceptance by the people, not by virtue of its drafting history or 
the superiority of the virtue or intellect of James Madison and his brethren.  
The goal of constitutional interpretation is not to capture what James 
Madison meant but to capture what the constitutional text means.  Though 
determining what is entailed by a project of capturing the meaning of the 
constitutional text is properly the subject of controversy and debate, the 
idea of original public meaning at least better identifies the content and 
orientation of one contender within that debate. 
Second, original meaning better captures the search for the public 
meaning of an objective legal rule.  The language of original intent too 
often encouraged the pursuit down false trails in an effort to locate the 
preferences of political actors, or buried ideas, or value systems.  At the end 
of the day, constitutional interpretation by judges is concerned with 
understanding and articulating authoritative legal rules, and a vital task of 
originalism is to help guide constitutional interpreters to a better 
understanding of the applicable constitutional rules. 
A clearer focus on original public meaning also minimizes some of the 
problems that were thought to be associated with original intent.44  First, it 
avoids some of the problems associated with the search for subjective 
intent.  Paul Brest took the lead in criticizing a method that would seek to 
“try to figure out how [the legislator] would have decided any particular 
case.”45  The degree of knowledge on the part of the interpreter, and the 
degree of foresight on the part of the legislator, to persuasively build such a 
counterfactual for issues that might arise today seemed to require heroic 
assumptions.  By contrast, even Brest conceded that relevant evidence for 
identifying the historical public meaning of the text was readily available, 
even if it was not always determinant or determinative.46 
 
 43. Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 751, 756, 759 (1987). 
 44. Such concerns are unlikely to go away entirely, even if the theory is more clearly 
understood to be concerned with original meaning.  Interpreters must still attempt to 
determine what the public or commonly understood meaning of a given constitutional 
provision might be and what legal rule might be embodied in a given piece of text, and those 
tasks will still involve sifting through potentially contradictory or incomplete evidence and 
making the best possible judgment as to what the evidence suggests.  And, of course, critics 
of originalism are still likely to have a variety of other concerns about the approach besides 
those specifically associated with some forms of intentionalism. 
 45. Brest, supra note 13, at 212.  It is possible that the category of “strict intentionalist” 
as Brest defined it was always a null set, since few commentators of the period seem to have 
endorsed this approach and Brest did not cite any examples. 
 46. Id. at 231 (“Moderate originalism is a perfectly sensible strategy of constitutional 
decisionmaking.”). 
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Second, the focus on public meaning also avoids some of the problems 
associated with uncovering collective intent.  In practice, legal interpreters 
do not deal with a legislator, but rather with a legislature composed of 
multiple legislators.  If assessing original intent is the target for the 
interpreter, then we may find ourselves enmeshed in efforts to count 
“intention-votes” and determine how the myriad subjective intentions of 
multiple legislators can be aggregated up into a single collective legislative 
intent.  Although lawyers and judges are familiar with discussions of 
legislative intent (and the challenges associated with those discussions), 
constitutional original intent was often thought to be more slippery, 
subjective, and idiosyncratic.  Recasting originalism in terms of original 
meaning refocuses on the type of “objective” or “embodied” intent that is 
closer to conventional understandings of legislative intent. 
Even so, original “intent” still has some relevance in theories of 
originalism.  The historical sources of interest to originalists in the 1970s 
and 1980s continue to have some bearing as useful evidence of public 
meaning.  Identifying how the delegates of the Philadelphia Convention 
talked about and understood a given piece of text is a productive starting 
point for uncovering the public meaning of that legal language in the 
period.  What James Madison might have recorded delegates as saying may 
not have pride of place in determining the public meaning of a textual 
provision, but when added to other sources of information it might well be 
informative of how those familiar and careful with language understood the 
content of the rule that was being debated and adopted.  Even more 
specifically, the records of Founding debates may be informative of the 
significance of the particular choice of language incorporated into the text.  
Such evidence must always be handled carefully.  Alternative language, for 
example, might have been rejected either because it was excluded from the 
rule being adopted or because it was already included within that rule.  But 
understanding how a debate progressed when the formulation of the text 
and the adoption of a rule were still uncertain may be helpful in unpacking 
the nuance of meaning contained in a particular piece of text as it was used 
in this context. 
2.  Expected Applications 
But the greater theoretical attention to original meaning does have some 
implications for the practice of originalist constitutional interpretation.  An 
orientation to public meaning rather than intentions calls attention to the 
limited relevance of original expectations about legal applications.  Like 
many commentators in the initial round of debate over originalism, Brest 
highlighted the potential significance of original expectations.  He imagined 
that the originalist interpreter would first ask, what would James Madison 
do?  The question not only invited an examination of the particular thoughts 
and desires of a particular individual involved in the Founding debates, but 
it also suggested that the goal of originalist constitutional interpretation was 
to recapture the mindset of a Framer and implement their preferences for 
how specific disputes ought to be resolved.  The task seems simultaneously 
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impossible and unappealing.  Even if a judge could successfully channel 
James Madison while answering the question of whether the Affordable 
Care Act is consistent with the Commerce Clause, the results would not be 
decisive for a proper originalist inquiry. 
Specific expectations about the consequences of a legal rule are distinct 
from the meaning of the rule itself.  Bork took notice of this point as well, 
though still speaking in terms of intentions. 
In short, all an intentionalist requires is that the text, structure, and history 
of the Constitution provide him not with a conclusion but with a major 
premise.  That premise states a core value that the Framers intended to 
protect.  The intentionalist judge must then supply the minor premise in 
order to protect the constitutional freedom in circumstances the Framers 
could not foresee.47 
Although Bork situates this point in the context of “circumstances the 
Framers could not foresee,” the argument is in fact generalizable to include 
circumstances that the Founders could see.48  The point does not turn on the 
“open textured” or “general” quality of the textual provision in question.49  
The key issue is that the words used had a generally understood meaning 
which expressed an identifiable rule.  The rule might be rephrased in a way 
that makes it easier to apply or that breaks out various key considerations 
and subcomponents, but the textual provision embodies a legal commitment 
of its own that the interpreter attempts first to ascertain.  As such, the text, 
structure, and history provide Bork’s “major premise.”  The text does not, 
however, tell the interpreter how to resolve a given dispute.  Once the rule 
itself is clarified, the resolution of a given dispute might be obvious.  But 
the effort to think through how a rule would apply to a given circumstance 
is a distinct jurisprudential effort from that of identifying the appropriate 
rule in the first place.  A student must first understand what the accepted 
constitutional rule for determining the scope of congressional power was 
under the Commerce Clause at the turn of the twentieth century, but it is a 
distinct task to then determine whether Congress could regulate stockyards 
given that rule. 
 
 47. Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 823, 826 (1986). 
 48. It possible that Bork thought this point was restricted to those circumstances that the 
Founders did not see.  In his first forays into originalist theory, Bork implied that the 
interpreter would be bound if the Founders had a clear and uniform view regarding a 
particular application regardless of a generally phrased text.  Bork is not clear why he might 
have believed this would follow. Bork, supra note 30, at 13 (“If the legislative history 
revealed a consensus about segregation in schooling . . . I do not see how the Court could 
escape the choices revealed . . . even though the words are general and conditions have 
changed.”). 
 49. Ronald Dworkin forcefully argued against a kind of expectations originalism, in 
which constitutional provisions are read “to have the consequences that those who made 
them expected them to have.” Ronald M. Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 119 (1997).  Although I think this basic caution has been 
widely accepted by originalists, I have more difficulty with the particular version of semantic 
originalism that Dworkin recommended as the alternative to the flawed expectations 
originalism. See Whittington, supra note 23, at 197. 
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Why might the original expectations about the application of a rule and 
the original content of the rule diverge?  First, it must be recognized that 
expectations about consequences are not dispositive to ascertaining the 
content of the constitutional rule itself.  The drafters of a constitutional 
provision may have a variety of conflicting goals and expectations about a 
constitutional provision, and yet reach an agreement on the meaning of the 
provision under consideration.  Borrowing from the political theorist 
Quentin Skinner, we can usefully distinguish between an intent to do 
something and an intent in doing something.50  A motive is prior to the text, 
and is only contingently connected to the text (the motive could be 
different, and yet the text and its meaning could be the same, or the motive 
could be present, and a different text with different meaning could be 
adopted).  Similarly, expectations about applications are merely predictions 
about the future consequences of adopting a given legal rule, and the author 
of the rule has no special privilege in predicting the future.51 
The drafters could, in fact, be wrong about the consequences of their own 
constitutional rule.  If they wrote a natural born citizen qualification for the 
presidential office with a desire and expectation that this rule would 
preclude a given individual from assuming the office, there could be a 
perfect understanding of the meaning of the qualification and yet the 
consequence may not follow (e.g., they were wrong about the birth status of 
the individual in question, and thus the rule posed no obstacle to a 
presidential run).  Similarly, they could be wrong about the principled 
implications that follow from the primary rule (e.g., how the natural born 
citizen qualification would apply to children of ambassadors born on 
foreign soil).  The more complicated or less precise the constitutional text 
being adopted, the more opportunities there will be for such mistakes or 
uncertainties to arise.  The array of possible implications and applications 
of the age requirement for presidential eligibility may be easily foreseen 
and well understood as the provision is being adopted.  It might not be 
possible to say the same about the standard for impeachable offenses.  
Regardless, the proper mode of proceeding for a later adjudicator of a 
constitutional dispute involving those provisions is not to ask how the 
drafters would have resolved the present controversy.  The proper inquiry is 
what constitutional rule was adopted.  Having determined the answer to that 
question, the adjudicator must then determine how the rule applies to the 
current dispute. 
It is also worth recognizing that early government officials might not 
have fully and faithfully implemented the adopted constitutional rule 
themselves.  It is commonplace for judges to take the early interpretation of 
a constitutional provision as informative about the meaning of the 
provision, and such early practice is no doubt informative in illuminating an 
opaque rule.  But such behavior should still be viewed with some 
appropriate skepticism.  Constitutional drafters self-consciously limited 
 
 50. Quentin Skinner, Motives, Intentions, and the Interpretation of Texts, in MEANING 
AND CONTEXT 73 (James Tully ed., 1988). 
 51. See also WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 177–78. 
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themselves, as well as others, by erecting constitutional fences.  The 
purpose of constitutional rules is not simply to bind future generations.  
Political actors also tie their own hands by adopting a constitutional 
limitation.  The desire to bind contemporary government officials is part of 
the reason that we prefer constitutional conventions that are distinct from 
legislative assemblies, and ratification procedures that can affirm or reject 
constitutional proposals independent of legislative will.52  Incumbent 
politicians may have had a seat at the table when a constitutional provision 
was drafted, but they cannot continue to claim ownership of the 
constitutional text.  Otherwise, they could readily assume the authority to 
alter their handiwork at will.  Higher lawmaking and normal lawmaking 
should be kept distinct. 
Moreover, early government officials had their own reasons to deviate 
from constitutional rules.  Understanding the constitutional rule is distinct 
from adhering to the constitutional rule.  Famously, the Federalists who had 
advocated on behalf of the adoption of the Constitution in 1787 were 
splintered by 1797.  Although some of those disagreements might be 
accounted for by subconstitutional conflicts or matters that had been left 
unresolved in Philadelphia, the disputes also featured disagreements about 
potentially knowable constitutional meaning.  As Madison might have 
anticipated, the faithful interpretation and application of constitutional rules 
became more difficult once they were wrapped up in partisan fighting, 
factional interests, and personality clashes.  But even if early national 
politicians had acted as one with little disagreement, the same 
considerations could have affected their own ability to adhere to their prior 
constitutional commitments.  The exigencies of the moment could place 
pressure on the first generation as easily as subsequent generations, and 
evidence of how they would have or did interpret or apply constitutional 
commitments should be held separate from evidence of how the rule was 
understood when it was adopted. 
Despite these cautions, expected applications might be helpful to later 
interpreters in clarifying the substantive content of the embodied 
constitutional rule.  The Founders could be mistaken or disingenuous about 
the implications of adopting a proposed rule, but the rule itself must be 
publicly understandable.53  If examples of likely applications of the rule are 
regularly offered and there is widespread agreement on such applications, 
then they may be reflective of the content of the rule in question.  If, for 
example, a given application would help distinguish between two plausible 
interpretations of a textual provision, then the existence of a consensus 
 
 52. The use of constitutions to target contemporary government officials is effectively 
examined in the state context in EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG 
PLACES:  WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 49–55 (2013). 
 53. Dworkin, by contrast, would hold open the possibility that the Founders were 
mistaken about the rule itself, and not merely its applications.  In his famous illustration, the 
father might be wrong not only about what the implications of the commandment to “play 
fair” but also about what the principle of fairness actually is.  For Dworkin, it is the true 
principle, not the legislator’s mistaken view of it, that is authoritative.  RONALD M. 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134–36 (1977). 
386 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
about the application might allow us to better understand which of the 
plausible alternatives was in fact being proposed and adopted.  The point is 
not that the Founders correctly anticipated a given application, but that 
knowing the application and its relationship to possible principles would 
allow us to infer the otherwise obscure rule.  The insight to be gleaned is 
not the authoritative status of the expected application, but the apparent rule 
at play given that such an application is expected to follow from it.  If we 
know that the Founders simultaneously adopted a rule against cruel and 
unusual punishments and embraced the death penalty, this should not help 
us assemble a list of accepted punishments or create a special carve-out for 
the death penalty from the general principle.  Rather, it should help guide us 
in understanding what principle they thought they were adopting with the 
cruel and unusual punishment clause.54 
3.  Rules and Standards 
One implication that was often thought to follow from a focus on original 
intentions was the narrow reading of constitutional provisions.  Scalia has 
notably argued against the identification of originalism and “strict 
construction,” though the two were often linked by conservative politicians 
and jurists in the 1970s and 1980s.  As Scalia observed, the “text should not 
be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be 
construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”55  Thinking in 
terms of specific intentions and expected applications can give 
constitutional provisions the feel of a laundry list of allowed or proscribed 
government actions.  The interpreter’s job is therefore to identify the 
contents of the list and check the disputed actions of government officials 
against that list. 
Originalism has instead recently emphasized the value of fidelity to the 
constitutional text as its driving principle.  The goal of constitutional 
interpretation is not to restrict the text to the most manageable, easily 
applied, or majority-favoring rules.  The goal is to faithfully reproduce what 
the constitutional text requires.  Textual rules need not be narrow.  The 
breadth of the rule is determined by the embodied principle, not an a priori 
commitment to narrowness. 
It is entirely possible for constitutional drafters to establish general or 
abstract rules or to prefer broad standards over narrow rules.  Although such 
broadly worded rules may provide less guidance to later interpreters than 
narrowly crafted rules, they are not therefore without content.  The Equal 
Protection Clause has a meaning that can be interpreted and applied (though 
perhaps with less certainty), even if it is framed more broadly than the rules 
regarding the eligibility of candidates for presidential office. 
 
 54. Even so, having inferred from various pieces of evidence what the meaning of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is, the adjudicator might still conclude that the 
Founders were mistaken in thinking that the death penalty and the constitutional provision 
could be reconciled in a principled way.  The burden for making out such an argument 
would necessarily be heavy, however. 
 55. SCALIA, supra note 6, at 23. 
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The distinction between broad and abstract constitutional principles and 
narrow and specific constitutional rules is perhaps most familiar from the 
work of Ronald Dworkin.  For Dworkin, the Constitution spoke most 
importantly in “majestic abstraction.”56  A Dworkinian interpreter would 
provide an “abstract, principled, moral reading” of the text, rather than “a 
concrete, dated reading.”57  There may be difficulties with Dworkin’s 
particular approach to the distinction, but he usefully reminds us of the 
possibility of intended principles.  Constitutional rules are not confined to 
the choice between long or short lists of specific applications.  Broad 
language may well be used to convey specifically chosen, content-rich 
commitments.  Jack Balkin notes that constitutions employ a complex 
“linguistic technology of regulation and constraint.”58 
The text of our Constitution contains different kinds of language.  It 
contains determinate rules. . . .  It contains standards. . . .  And it contains 
principles. . . .  If the text states a determinate rule, we must apply the rule 
because that is what the text offers us.  If it states a standard, we must 
apply the standard.  And if it states a general principle, we must apply the 
principle.59 
Balkin observes that standards and principles “do not constrain people in 
the same way that rules do,” but that is not to say that they do not constrain 
or do not have a discoverable content.60 
It is also possible for constitutional drafters to simply delegate discretion 
to later government officials.  As originalists have long recognized (and 
sometimes even emphasized), the power-granting provisions of the 
Constitution are designed to give the legislative and executive branches 
discretionary authority to make policy and the necessary tools to implement 
those policies.  By the same token, it is at least conceptually possible to 
recognize that constitutional drafters might similarly empower judges 
through constitutional provisions that authorize them to exercise substantial 
discretion.  With a primary commitment to constitutional fidelity (rather 
than, for example, the restraint of judicial discretion), originalists have at 
least accepted the possibility of textual provisions embodying broad 
standards.  The breadth of any given constitutional commitment and the 
extent to which it delegates discretionary authority are ultimately empirical 
questions to be resolved through the examination of the text. 
 
 56. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 145 (1993). 
 57. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity:  Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and 
Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1997). 
 58. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 43 (2011). 
 59. Id. at 6. 
 60. Id. at 43.  Balkin’s elaboration of the idea of textual principles suggests that 
principles are largely delegations to future decisionmakers.  One does not have to go that far 
to embrace the notion that the text may embody standards that cover a wider array of 
situations, provide less concrete guidance, and require more “practical reasoning” than rules 
do. See id. at 349 n.12.  Balkin would read the relevance of what he calls “historical 
principles or historical standards” differently than I would. Id. at 40. 
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4.  Constitutional Pluralism 
One of the significant new critiques of originalism that has emerged in 
recent years has been the charge that the current judicial practice does not 
reflect originalist commitments.61  To the extent that normative 
constitutional theory should be concerned with legitimatizing how judicial 
review is currently exercised, a theoretical position that does not describe 
current reality would be problematic.62  There are a variety of ways in 
which this sort of critique can be framed, but here, I am concerned with a 
particular aspect of the argument.  It is frequently observed that American 
constitutional jurisprudence is descriptively “pluralistic” in its 
methodological approach.63  There are various ways of mapping the 
argumentative terrain in contemporary American constitutional discourse, 
but one prominent typology identifies six common modalities of 
constitutional argumentation that are apparently accepted as legitimate by 
practitioners, including historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, 
and ethical arguments.64  Any theory that elevates a single modality of 
constitutional argumentation as its centerpiece, therefore, would seem to 
run into some difficulty with reconciling its recommendation of 
argumentative monism with an accepted practice of argumentative 
pluralism. 
I believe that most current originalists sidestep the main force of this 
distinctive critique.65  Arguments about original meaning are usually 
characterized as one among many that interpreters might reasonably employ 
to elucidate the meaning of the Constitution and develop the content of 
constitutional law.66  To what extent, therefore, does originalist theory 
recommend that judges and others lay down the various interpretive tools 
with which they are familiar and employ only one historical method?  From 
an originalist perspective, is it inappropriate and illegitimate for judges and 
other constitutional interpreters to make use of a range of argumentative 
modalities when attempting to ascertain constitutional meaning?  There is a 
place for pluralism within originalism, but originalist theory would argue 
 
 61. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 
1195. 
 62. A weaker version of this concern would suggest that the empirical reality should at 
least be recognizably related to any credible normative theory such that it is possible to see 
how plausible reform might bring the two into alignment.  If descriptive and normative 
theories are apparently unrelated to one another, then we might waive the latter away as 
mere utopianism. 
 63. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 23–24 (1982); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1189 (1987); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
1753 (1994). 
 64. BOBBITT, supra note 63, at 23–24. 
 65. The aspect of this critique that still bites originalism joins with other arguments 
contending that original meaning is not authoritative for purposes of guiding the formation 
of constitutional doctrine.  This general argument is discussed below. 
 66. The argument in this section borrows from Keith E. Whittington, On Pluralism 
Within Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM 70 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. 
Miller eds., 2011). 
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that such a wide array of argumentative modalities should be carefully 
disciplined by the overarching interpretive enterprise.  Originalism is less 
about method or form of argument than about interpretive purpose. 
The originalist project is committed to uncovering, to the degree 
possible, the meaning of the rule or principle that those who were 
authorized to create the Constitution meant to communicate, not to making 
use of any particular form of constitutional argument.  Arguments 
marshaling historical evidence about Framers’ intent and original meaning 
and drawing on sources such as ratification convention debates or early 
constitutional commentary are the obvious form that originalist arguments 
are expected to take.  They provide the clearest examples of the originalist 
modality for creating and illustrating typologies of constitutional 
argumentation, and they provide the most direct basis for considering the 
acceptability and authoritativeness of referencing original meaning in order 
to resolve current constitutional disputes. 
But if the goal of the interpretive enterprise, for originalists, is to 
discover the meaning that the author was attempting to convey through the 
text, then the interpreter should not have strong precommitments regarding 
the type of evidence that might be helpful for discovering and 
understanding that meaning.  Originalists are committed to an interpretive 
effort, not an argumentative form.  When available and illuminating, 
classically historical arguments should no doubt be given great weight.  But 
historical materials as such are likely to tell only part of the story.  Relevant 
materials may not be particularly probative of the specific issues that are of 
concern to us, or may in themselves leave substantial indeterminacies to be 
resolved as to what the constitutional meaning might be. 
Other modalities of constitutional argumentation may also be deployed 
within an originalist framework.  It is no accident that Robert Bork, for 
example, tended to speak of originalists being focused on the “text, 
structure, and history of the Constitution.”67  Exclusive reliance on external, 
historical evidence as such was never thought to be the defining feature of 
originalism.  The text of the Constitution is quite appropriately the first 
piece of evidence that an originalist would consult in interpreting the 
document, and both Scalia and Solum characterize originalism as a form of 
textualism.68  A close textual analysis of the words and phrases that were 
actually chosen for inclusion in the Constitution, the relationships among 
them, and their relationship to other texts is a ready starting point for 
originalist analysis.  An originalist might well expect that the words in the 
text have a “plain meaning” that is readily accessible, and would certainly 
expect that the words in the text convey meaning and would be 
 
 67. Bork, supra note 47, at 826; see also Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of 
Humility in Judicial Review:  A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the 
Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1273 (1997) (advocating adherence to 
“commitments made by the people in the past, and embodied in text, history, tradition, and 
precedent”). 
 68. See SCALIA, supra note 6; Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Texting, 44 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 123 (2007). 
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comprehensible to appropriate audiences even without extrinsic interpretive 
aids (such as access to convention debates).  Framing originalism in terms 
of original meaning (rather than original intent) has put even greater 
emphasis on the text as an independent bearer of original meaning. 
For similar reasons, arguments grounded in structures or values implicit 
in or embedded in the constitutional scheme or language are likewise fair 
game for originalists.  Originalist arguments need not be clause-bound.  
Arguments drawn from the design of the Constitution, the background 
assumptions of the Constitution, or even the “ethos” or traditions of the 
people may well be appropriate from an originalist standpoint, so long as 
the aim is to illuminate the meaning of the constitutional rules put in place 
by those who created the document.  Examining the constitutional design 
for clues about original constitutional meaning is, in principle, as useful as 
examining the constitutional text. 
Doctrinal arguments are perhaps the most common form of constitutional 
argumentation in contemporary legal and judicial practice.  There are good 
reasons why this should be the case, and originalist theory does not suggest 
that doctrinal arguments should not predominate in most legal decisions.  
Precedent provides intellectual shortcuts for thinking about the meaning of 
a law and how it might be applied to a range of common problems.  A case 
of first impression may require examining the full range of messy 
arguments relating to constitutional meaning, but over time, precedent 
should have distilled those arguments down to a set of more reliable and 
accepted conclusions.  For Supreme Court justices, as much as for lower 
court judges or executive branch officials, doctrine provides an easy to 
follow and more detailed constitutional rulebook that does not require 
mastering and synthesizing a wide array of materials and arguments for 
every case or problem that might arise.  Precedent translates the 
Constitution into ubiquitous and accessible constitutional rules, and most 
constitutional cases are really disputes about routine administration of those 
agreed-upon rules of our baseline constitutional understandings.  For most 
legal disputes involving the Constitution, we are primarily concerned with 
constitutional administration, applying what we have already learned from 
earlier disputes.  The goal is not to return to first principles and to get the 
meaning of the Constitution itself right.  Such cases are concerned with 
clarifying the meaning and implication of judicial doctrine.  They assume 
that the doctrine correctly and adequately conveys constitutional meaning. 
Yet the way in which originalists make use of a plurality of 
argumentative forms may still be distinctive.  The various arguments and 
evidence adduced by an originalist serve the particular function of 
advancing our ability to understand and apply the original meaning of the 
Constitution.  The various modalities of constitutional argument are 
tethered to the originalist enterprise.  An originalist would therefore resist 
any independent normative force that such argumentative approaches might 
have.  The array of constitutional arguments can be used to clarify original 
meaning, not trump identifiable original meaning.  To the extent that such 
argumentative modalities lead us away from, rather than toward, original 
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meaning, then, to borrow from Justice Clarence Thomas, the originalist 
would have to conclude that “[s]omething has gone seriously awry with this 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.”69 
B.  Judicial Restraint 
The commitment to judicial restraint is distinct from the commitment to 
an originalist interpretive approach.  The former is focused on when judicial 
review ought to be exercised and the relative authority of legislatures and 
courts.  The latter is focused on how constitutional meaning is understood.  
Although a preference for judicial restraint might lead one naturally to 
originalism as an interpretive approach, the acceptance of originalism as an 
interpretive approach has no necessary implications for judicial restraint. 
The separation of judicial restraint from originalism is one of the more 
distinctive features of the recent originalist literature.  Advocates of 
originalism during the Reagan era were almost uniformly also advocates of 
judicial restraint, and the two commitments were often conflated in both 
scholarly and popular discourse.  Reflecting an inherited New Deal 
sensibility, this originalism was a vehicle for empowering popular 
majorities by preventing judges from behaving as superlegislatures.70  
Originalism was a tool of majoritarian democrats. 
There is nothing like the same level of agreement within the recent 
originalist literature on the desirability of judicial restraint.  Rather, there is 
agreement on the separation between interpretive approach and judicial 
posture.  Within that open space, originalists have recently taken a variety 
of positions, from continuing to advocate judicial restraint71 to embracing a 
more active exercise of the power of judicial review.72  But the primary 
virtue now claimed by originalism is one of constitutional fidelity, not of 
judicial restraint or democratic majoritarianism. 
In order to elaborate more fully on the separation between originalism 
and judicial restraint, we should distinguish between two distinct ideas that 
are often referenced by the common term of “judicial restraint.”  The first 
idea might be referred to as “judicial discretion” and concerns the degree of 
choice and will in judicial decisionmaking.  The second idea might be 
referred to as “judicial deference” and concerns how tentative judges should 
be in striking down legislation as unconstitutional.  Neither idea follows 
inevitably from a commitment to originalism. 
1.  Judicial Discretion 
Excessive judicial discretion has been a recurring concern in American 
political history.  Politicians and scholars alike have worried that judges 
have too many opportunities to express their individual moral and political 
 
 69. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 518 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 70. See Whittington, supra note 15, at 602–03. 
 71. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial 
Activism:  A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2005). 
 72. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004). 
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preferences while conducting their official duties.  Rather than faithfully 
adhering to constitutional requirements, judges may be “tempted” to use 
their position to advance favored policies at the expense of the law.73  The 
challenge would then be to find a way to constrain judges just as judges 
attempt to constrain other government officials.  An originalist approach to 
constitutional interpretation was offered as a potential solution to this 
problem by delimiting how judges make decisions. 
The hope that a public commitment to originalism would force judges to 
restrain themselves and limit their discretion would seem to have been 
overly optimistic.74  As a practical matter, no interpretive method is likely 
to restrict discretion in judicial decisionmaking, and originalism is unlikely 
to perform any better in this regard than various other approaches to 
constitutional interpretation.  To the extent that we are worried about willful 
judges rendering arbitrary decisions, most interpretive methods offer the 
means for criticizing such judges.  As constitutional theory has blossomed, 
it has become more apparent that constitutional adjudication is 
characterized more by normative disagreement than bad faith, and 
normative disagreement in turn can be rooted in theoretical disagreement.  
A faithful Dworkinian can be self-restrained by her interpretive method, 
and be subjected to scrutiny and criticism for failure to appropriately apply 
the favored method.  The apparent abuse of discretion is more likely to be 
attributable to what Jeremy Waldron has called the “circumstances of 
politics” that comes from good-faith disagreements over what is to be done 
than to willfulness.75  Limiting judicial discretion has rarely been offered as 
a compelling justification for the adoption of originalism in the recent 
literature. 
2.  Judicial Deference 
The willingness of judges to interpose their constitutional judgments in 
policy disputes and to block the implementation of politically determined 
public policies has been a further source of persistent debate.  The first 
wave of the modern originalist literature came in response to the 
constitutional decisions of the Warren Court and early Burger Court,76 and 
was developed from a critical stance.  The  Supreme Court justices were 
seen as unduly activist—too willing to exercise the power of judicial review 
and nullify state and federal policies.  Originalism was seen by many to be a 
solution to that problem.  Advocacy of originalism often went hand-in-hand 
 
 73. BORK, supra note 5, at 2. 
 74. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 33–59 (2012). 
 75. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 102 (1999).  The inherent difficulty of 
the judicial task and core indeterminacies in the constitutional text are also likely to breed 
disagreements, even if a hegemony of a single interpretive method could be established.  
Good-faith originalists will also come to different answers for difficult constitutional 
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 76. The Warren Court lasted from 1953 to 1969.  The Burger Court followed and its first 
few years continued to embody many of the liberal impulses that characterized the Warren 
Court. 
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with a strong Thayerian deference,77 which urged judges to strike down 
statutes only in the most extreme cases when no reasonable defense of the 
laws could be offered.  Both the substantive content of the original 
Constitution and the high information requirements for an originalist judge 
to reach clear conclusions about constitutional meaning suggested to early 
originalists that democratic majorities would be empowered to act. 
The recent literature has had a different emphasis.  There is now a 
widespread emphasis on the centrality of constitutional fidelity to the 
originalist project, rather than the centrality of judicial restraint.  If the 
primary commitment of originalist theory is to maintain the inherited 
constitutional rule against the temptations to deviate from it or alter it, then 
the tendency of the judiciary to uphold or strike down political actions must 
be purely contingent.  The stringency of constitutional requirements and the 
decisions of political actors will determine the extent to which an originalist 
court will actively strike down legislation.  Upholding the constitutional 
rule, as originally understood, may or may not require upholding 
contemporary legislation. 
A commitment to judicial deference is a potential add-on to an originalist 
theory of constitutional interpretation.  As such, it might be independently 
justified as a value that is unrelated to originalism but is nonetheless worth 
adopting.  There is little consensus among current originalists that a general 
principle of judicial deference is separately attractive.  Indeed, many would 
regard judicial deference as subversive of the primary commitment of 
originalism to identify and adhere to the original meaning of the 
Constitution. 
Judicial deference may nonetheless be regarded as implicit in a 
commitment to originalism rather than a separate normative principle.  Few 
recent originalists have made such an argument, but unpacking that 
possibility is worthwhile.  Three possible angles seem most likely to be 
productive.  First, the Constitution might itself be thought to embody 
democratic majoritarianism.  To the extent that the text entrusts democratic 
majorities with extensive powers to make public policy, then the judiciary 
would have little authority to stand in their way.  Such a reading of the 
Constitution seems implausible, however.  Although some specific features 
of the Constitution are clearly designed to give policymaking flexibility to 
elected officials, others delimit that authority and impose constraints on 
political power.  A generalized policy of judicial deference to the actions of 
government officials does not seem consistent with that “Madisonian” 
balance.78  Second, the clear mistake rule might itself be part of original 
meaning of a textual provision of the Constitution.  James Bradley Thayer 
spent much of his classic article making out something like that argument, 
though he emphasized early jurisprudential traditions more than original 
 
 77. Thayerian deference emphasizes a “clear mistake” rule for when statutes of doubtful 
constitutionality should be struck down, as advanced most influentially in James Bradley 
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. 
REV. 129 (1893). 
 78. BORK, supra note 5, at 139. 
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textual commitments as such.79  But others have found little evidence that 
the original meaning of the Constitution directs the Court to adopt such a 
restrictive reading of its own powers.80  Third, we might think that proper 
respect for the constitutional judgment of elected officials demands that 
judges defer to them.  But to the extent that the very practice of judicial 
review follows from the judiciary’s duty to interpret and apply the law of 
the Constitution, judges would seem to be obliged to follow their own 
judgment about the law’s meaning rather than defer to the judgment of 
others.  While judges should perhaps be modest about the strength of their 
own insights into constitutional meaning, that humility suggests that they 
should learn from others and not simply accept the conclusions that others 
have reached.81  On the whole, the case for judicial deference would seem 
to rest in a separate normative argument, rather than being implicit in 
originalism or the original Constitution itself.  There is little agreement 
among originalists that courts should be especially deferential when 
exercising the power of judicial review. 
II.  POINTS OF CONTENTION 
Recent originalists do not, of course, agree on every point of originalist 
theory.  While there are important points of agreement, many of which both 
unite recent advocates of originalism and distinguish them from key 
features of older versions of originalism, there remain points of internal 
contestation.  These continuing points of contention emphasize the fact that 
originalist theory remains a work in progress and that adjustments and 
refinements in the theory are likely to occur in the future, just as they have 
in the past.82 
A.  Justifications for Originalism 
One area in which agreement has not yet been reached is in identifying 
the best justification for adopting an originalist approach to constitutional 
interpretation.  There has at least been some winnowing down of the 
options, and some justifications for originalism that were once under active 
consideration now receive relatively little attention.  The idea that 
originalism is justified by a commitment to judicial restraint has already 
been mentioned.  For a generation concerned with reining in the Warren 
Court, a chief attraction of originalism was that it seemed to make plain the 
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 80. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Judicial Power, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. 
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 81. See McConnell, supra note 67, at 1292–93. 
 82. Perhaps it goes without saying that originalists will no doubt disagree among 
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interpretation rather than theory. 
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Court’s errors, and held some promise of preventing judges from making 
the same errors in the future.  In recent years, the desire to restrain the 
courts has not had a prominent place in academic defenses of originalism.83 
There also now appears to be substantial agreement that the best 
justification for originalism will not itself be historical.  The significance of 
the “interpretive intentions” of the Founders in mandating that current 
interpreters adopt an originalist philosophy was, most notably, aggressively 
advocated by Raoul Berger.84  The argument for interpretive intentions has 
played relatively little role in the originalist literature of the past two 
decades.  The shift away from trying to root originalist theory in 
interpretive intentions has been driven less by a belief that the Founding 
generation did not itself accept some form of originalism and more by the 
conviction that interpretive intentions are ultimately irrelevant for 
evaluating contemporary normative theories of constitutional interpretation 
and adjudication.  The Founders may well have embraced originalism 
themselves, but such evidence will not do much to advance the argument 
for originalism. 
Three considerations might be noted in pointing to the irrelevance of 
interpretive intentions for originalist theory.  First, we might think of 
interpretive intentions as a form of expected applications.  As noted above, 
the authoritativeness of original expectations about the applications 
associated with the adoption and implementation of a given constitutional 
rule have been generally rejected in originalist theory.  Rather, it is the 
original meaning of the substantive content of the rule (as distinct from the 
expected consequences of the rule) that is the target for originalist inquiries.  
The Founders might well have expected that later interpreters would be 
guided by their own understandings of the Constitution, but such 
expectations would have been grounded in general theories about judicial 
decisionmaking and legal interpretation and could well be disappointed 
without doing damage to the embodied meaning of the text itself.  The 
Founders might have expected that the federal judiciary would often or 
rarely strike down laws as unconstitutional, would play an important or a 
minor role in federal policymaking, would deploy a wide range of legal 
tools to enforce and implement their judgments, or would have few tools 
available.  Such ideas about how the practice of constitutional dispute 
resolution and adjudication would play out under the constitutional text 
could be either prescient or myopic, but they are not authoritative. 
Second, interpretive intentions are not themselves embodied in a textual 
constitutional rule.  It seems plausible that the Founders could have 
entrenched a particular interpretive approach to the Constitution by 
including a textual instruction to future interpreters.  From an originalist 
 
 83. The place of originalism in popular discourse may rest on a different footing. See 
Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009). 
 84. Raoul Berger, “Original Intention” in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 296 (1986).  This justification for originalism was likewise aggressively attacked by 
critics. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
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perspective at least, such a text-based second-order rule would be as 
authoritative and binding as any other constitutional rule, only in this case 
the rule would direct and constrain interpreters rather than directing and 
constraining the substantive exercise of political power by government 
officials.  The Constitution, however, contains very few explicit interpretive 
guidelines, and nothing that speaks to the general interpretive approach to 
be taken toward the document.85  Any interpretive intentions that the 
Founders might have had regarding the Constitution were left at the level of 
background assumptions and expectations about future behavior.86  An 
emphasis on original meaning would lead us to ask where those interpretive 
intentions appear in the Constitution itself—to ask what aspect of the 
Constitution (whether textual provision or structural principle) conveys a 
constitutional rule that all constitutional rules should be interpreted 
according to their original meaning.  The Constitution seems to lack such an 
element.87 
Finally, reliance on any interpretive intentions of the Founders as 
sufficient grounding for an interpretive theory seems inadequate.  Any 
normative theory regarding constitutional interpretation and adjudication 
requires an explanation of why current political actors should regard that 
theory as compelling.  Reliance on the factual existence of interpretive 
intentions is liable to appear circular, asking current political actors to bind 
themselves to the original meaning of the Constitution because such a 
practice would have the original meaning of the Constitution.  Ultimately, 
we would want a theory to justify and explain the desirability of 
constitutional fidelity and the exercise of judicial review.  Why should we 
follow this set of constitutional rules (the set of constitutional rules 
contained in the original meaning of the text) rather than some other?  
Justifying any particular approach requires normative argumentation, not 
appeal to authority.  We cannot bootstrap our way to an interpretative 
theory. 
If there is mostly agreement in the current originalist literature on the 
need for a normative theory (other than the instrumental desire to restrain 
the courts) to justify the adoption of originalism, there is disagreement on 
what that theory should be.  Proponents of originalism have in recent years 
developed a variety of alternative justifications for the theory, and at least 
for the moment these alternatives have not yet been reconciled with one 
another or reduced to a common core. 
 
 85. The Ninth Amendment and Eleventh Amendment represent exceptions to this 
general pattern, being framed explicitly as directions to future interpreters. 
 86. There might be a case for discovering commitments regarding legal interpretation 
implicit in the “judicial power” delegated in Article III, but such a case has yet to be made. 
 87. I have argued that originalism is most consistent with a core structural feature of 
American constitutionalism, the existence of a written fundamental law drafted and ratified 
by popularly elected assemblies. WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 50–59.  I do believe that 
any persuasive interpretive theory must take account of and be reconcilable with this design 
feature, but I would not go so far as to argue that this structural feature embodies a clear set 
of interpretive intentions. 
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One approach is to justify originalism by reference to the likely political 
and policy outcomes to be generated by this approach to constitutional 
interpretation.88  Cass Sunstein suggests that a consideration of outcomes 
always drives approaches to judicial review.89  At the very least, we might 
imagine that the quality of the policy outcomes likely to be generated by a 
given normative constitutional theory has to be measured against some 
baseline of political legitimacy before we would be willing to take such a 
theory seriously.90  An approach to constitutional interpretation that 
systematically generates unjust results would be hard to sustain, and would 
eventually call into question either the interpretive approach or the 
fundamental law itself.91  The range of tolerable outcomes at least provides 
bounds on acceptable constitutional rules. 
But some would go further and argue that originalism provides positively 
attractive substantive policy outcomes.  We might simply imagine that the 
Constitution is particularly well written, such that its faithful interpretation 
and implementation will lead to desirable results.92  A more intriguing 
possibility has been suggested by John O. McGinnis and Michael B. 
Rappaport.93  Rather than suggesting that the Constitution just happens to 
be an excellent one, they argue that the constitution-creating procedures 
characteristic of American constitutionalism systematically produce good 
constitutional rules.  Of particular significance for them is the use of 
supermajority rules for higher lawmaking in the United States.  Such rules 
ensure that constitutional provisions will command widespread support and 
thus tend to enhance the general welfare.  Faithfully enforcing rules that 
have been vetted and approved through such procedures will, they contend, 
generate better political and policy outcomes than substituting rules that 
have not survived such a gauntlet. 
 
 88. The desire to generate judicial restraint is, in effect, a variation of this strategy.  The 
desirable policy outcome is one in which courts seldom interfere with public policy 
decisions and general innovative policies (or constitutional rules) of their own, and the 
recommended strategy to achieve this result is the adoption of originalism as a means for 
achieving judicial self-restraint.  This is a perfectly sound strategy for justifying the theory, 
but in practice few now believe that generalized judicial restraint is an attractive goal to 
pursue or that originalism is a particularly well-suited instrument for achieving that goal. 
 89. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS 20–23 (2009). 
 90. Much turns on how high the normative baseline of legitimacy is against which an 
actual constitution is to be measured. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 86–87; Randy E. 
Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (2003); Mark A. Graber, Our 
(Im)Perfect Constitution, 51 REV. POL. 86 (1989). 
 91. One might well ask whether it would be preferable to challenge the constitutional 
text itself rather than the effort to faithfully apply that text, but as a pragmatic matter a theory 
of constitutional interpretation that produces unacceptably bad results is unlikely to be 
politically sustainable.  On the problem of deeply flawed constitutions, see J.M. Balkin, 
Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703 (1997), 
and Mark A. Graber, Why Interpret? Political Justification and American Constitutionalism, 
56 REV. POL. 415 (1994). 
 92. Sunstein posits the hypothetical possibility of a “Scalialand” in which “the original 
public meaning of the Constitution is quite excellent,” and in which the “excellence of the 
Constitution” justifies an originalist approach. SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 21. 
 93. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION (2013). 
398 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
The supermajoritarian argument has the advantage of providing a 
rationale for expecting that an originalist constitution might provide 
superior results to constitutional rules elaborated in other ways.  But this 
sort of argument rests normative constitutional theory squarely on an 
evaluation of political outcomes.  Although we might have some reason to 
think that supermajority adoption rules are likely to produce some desirable 
features in public policy, the advantages of strict reliance on supermajority 
rules do not come without some costs.  Such rules introduce substantial 
status quo bias into the constitutional or political system, and such a bias 
may not always be welfare enhancing.  Resting the justification for 
enforcing constitutional rules on the quality of the outcomes resulting from 
them may also invite specific departures from an originalist constitution.  
Even if supermajority procedures generally produce high-quality rules, it 
might well be possible to identify exceptions (of either omission or 
commission) where better results could be achieved by substituting a rule 
that had not emerged from such a process.  The very justification for 
originalism might therefore authorize departures from originalism. 
Alternatively, one might view liberty to be the highest priority of 
constitutionalism.  The best approach to the exercise of judicial review and 
the interpretation of constitutional rules, therefore, might be driven by 
considerations of enhancing liberty.  Dworkin’s constitutional theory is 
reflective of this type of orientation.  For Dworkin, an emphasis on rights-
enhancement was most consistent with a “moral reading” of the 
Constitution, in which constitutional interpreters seek to make the 
Constitution as compatible as possible with the demands of moral 
philosophy.94  Dworkin was famously critical of originalism and would 
hardly conclude that an originalist constitution maximizes liberty.95  
Nonetheless, a Dworkinian theory might conclude either that the original 
Constitution we happen to have is, in fact, liberty maximizing, or that an 
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation is compatible with 
efforts to reconcile the demands of fit and justification in constitutional 
jurisprudence.96 
Deriving originalism from a primary commitment to rights 
foundationalism is complicated, but not impossible.  Such a justification for 
originalism is not without its difficulties.  Most efforts to construct 
constitutional theories on the base of rights foundationalism do not 
routinely lead to the conclusion that originalism is the preferred approach.97  
Grounding originalism in such a justificatory approach would entail 
defending not only the adoption of a rights-oriented theory, but also the 
specific conclusion that originalism is the best instantiation of such a 
theory.  Complicating that final conclusion is the possibility that originalism 
 
 94. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 2–3 (1996). 
 95. Id. at 13–14. 
 96. From different political directions, the originalist theories of Balkin and Barnett 
show some Dworkinian inspirations. See BALKIN, supra note 58; BARNETT, supra note 72. 
 97. For a critical discussion of such theories, see WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 27–32. 
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might not always maximize rights.  To the extent that in any particular 
instance rights could be further enhanced by departing from the original 
meaning of the Constitution, a rights-foundationalist argument might well 
suggest that such a departure should be made.  Again, originalism would 
seem to be purely contingent when grounded on this sort of justification.  
The potential tensions between the original meaning of the constitutional 
text and the conclusions of a moral reading of the Constitution might derive 
from the apparent deficiencies of the original meaning (from the perspective 
of moral philosophy), but also from the competing objectives of 
constitutionalism.  The protection of individual rights might be a core 
commitment of constitutionalism, but it is not the only purpose that 
constitutions are meant to serve.  Constitutions are also concerned with 
structuring and empowering government and coordinating political action.98  
The various purposes that constitutions are designed to serve may require 
compromises and adjustments, and a single-minded focus on enhancing 
rights might conflict with, rather than realize, the features and commitments 
of the original meaning of the Constitution. 
Finally, originalism has been justified by process-based considerations.  
Under this approach, pursing the original meaning of the Constitution is 
justified by the special status of the authorized lawmakers who established 
the fundamental rules to govern the polity.  Only those lawmakers were 
democratically authorized to create fundamental law, and the goal of 
constitutional interpretation therefore should be to uncover the content of 
the rules laid down by those lawmakers and faithfully apply them.  Drafting 
text for a written constitution allows for public deliberation and choice 
about the desired content of the fundamental law.  Originalism refers back 
to that deliberate choice and seeks to understand the substance, and not 
merely the form, of the rule that was adopted.  Originalism directs 
interpreters to defer to the authorized lawgiver, rather than deliberate anew 
on what might be desirable constitutional rules. 
This justificatory strategy is particularly concerned with judges as 
constitutional interpreters.  Normative constitutional theory is regularly 
focused on constitutional interpretation within a specific institutional 
context and for a specific purpose:  the exercise of the power of 
constitutional review by judges to nullify or uphold legislative policy.  The 
challenge is to explain the basis on which judges may exercise such an 
authority to overturn public policy endorsed by democratic institutions.  
Originalism points to the limited warrants on which government officials 
make policy to coerce social actors—warrants that are established in the 
same constitutional text that judges are called upon to interpret and enforce.  
The authority of legislators to make legitimate laws with binding force 
ultimately depends on the scope of their public office.  Government 
officials are chosen to make policy within the limited scope of their 
predefined legal authority.  The power of judicial review in a particular case 
 
 98. 1 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 5–10 (2013); Keith E. Whittington, Recovering “from the State of 
Imbecility,” 84 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1574–81 (2006). 
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is merely an inference from the general judicial duty to apply the law 
correctly and appropriately to the case at hand.99  Judges are justified in 
ignoring the dictates of a statute only when the statute conflicts with the 
superior authority of the Constitution.  Judicial action properly trumps 
legislative action only to the extent that the judicial action is properly 
grounded in the higher law endorsed by the people.100  By orienting judges 
to the original meaning of the Constitution as they exercise the power of 
judicial review, originalism preserves the ultimate authority of democratic 
decisionmakers to determine the content of the fundamental law.101 
B.  The Relationship Between Originalism and Judicial Review 
The theory of originalism may have been motivated by the particular 
practice and problems of judicial review and the judicial elaboration of 
constitutional law, but originalism is not itself a theory of constitutional 
adjudication.  Originalism offers an argument about how the Constitution 
should be interpreted.  Originalism is at least distinguishable from 
arguments about how courts ought to exercise the power of judicial review 
and what use courts ought to make of the Constitution while conducting 
their duties.  Given that originalism only partly covers the ground that is of 
interest to normative constitutional theory, it is no surprise that originalists 
continue to differ among themselves over how courts ought to exercise the 
power of judicial review and what the implications of the originalist logic 
might be for judicial interpreters in particular.102 
Most immediately, if not most obviously, originalists continue to 
disagree about whether courts are limited to constitutional interpretation.  
Originalist theory contends that a political actor engaging in constitutional 
interpretation ought to search for the original meaning of the constitutional 
text.  Originalist theory, narrowly construed, does not tell us whether judges 
should engage in constitutional interpretation or whether judges are limited 
to constitutional interpretation when evaluating the constitutionality of a 
law or resolving a constitutional dispute.  Establishing what is to be done 
when judges engage in judicial review requires a distinct normative 
argument that only partly overlaps with the kinds of justificatory strategies 
and interpretive contentions outlined above. 
There are, of course, some natural points of tangency between a theory of 
originalism and a theory of constitutional adjudication.  Many of the 
justifications for adopting originalism are aimed at judges and have in mind 
the practice of judicial review.  If originalist interpretation generates better 
 
 99. Philip Hamburger elaborates on the notion of judicial duty and its implications for 
constitutional law. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008). 
 100. On the basic logic of a dualist democratic system, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE (1993), and WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 135–42. 
 101. This point is developed at greater length in WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 152–59. 
 102. Solum, for example, is more modest in his ambitions than most in explicitly 
delimiting his inquiry to the nature of constitutional interpretation and declaring neutrality on 
contested normative issues of what judges ought to do. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic 
Originalism (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers 
Series, Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. 
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policy outcomes, optimizes liberty, or preserves democratic 
decisionmaking, then this would serve to recommend originalism to judges.  
Given a particular concern with the interpretation of legal texts and the 
process of the authoritative resolution of disputes, originalist theory seeks to 
clarify and guide the general practice of legal interpretation (while saying 
little about the interpretive process of such different enterprises as literary 
criticism or Biblical exegesis).  To the extent that judicial review as an 
ongoing political practice is understood to be a practice of constitutional 
interpretation and justified on the basis of the faithful interpretation of the 
fundamental law, then originalism works to make plain and refine those 
implicit commitments of existing legal practice. 
But there are many issues of constitutional adjudication and dispute 
resolution that do not fall so neatly within the ambit of originalist theory.  
What remedies can courts properly deploy when they are confronted with 
constitutional violations?  What sorts of disputes are properly subject to 
judicial intervention and resolution?  Are courts limited to constitutional 
interpretation when deciding how to respond to political disputes that have 
come before them?  May judges, for example, decide to ignore a 
constitutional rule that seems obsolete or unworkable?103  May judges take 
action to resolve a political problem even when the Constitution is silent or 
unclear?  Would the Supreme Court’s decisions in Brown v. Board of 
Education,104 Gray v. Sanders,105 or Bush v. Gore106 be justifiable even if 
they could not be grounded in constitutional interpretation?107  What 
standard of certainty must judges reach before determining to act on their 
perception of a constitutional violation against the constitutional judgments 
of other government officials?  Does the Constitution form the sum total of 
the fundamental law to be interpreted and applied by the courts, or may 
judges also make use of such materials as natural law or a judicially created 
common law as sources of constitutional law?  Originalism may hold some 
inherent answers to those questions, but there is room for disagreement 
among originalists over how such questions should be answered and there is 
as yet little agreement among originalists over such broader questions of 
constitutional adjudication. 
An unsettled, related question has commanded more attention within the 
originalist literature:  how much respect judges should pay to judicial 
precedents that are apparently inconsistent with the original meaning of the 
Constitution.  Originalist theory would indicate that the original meaning is 
 
 103. See Mark V. Tushnet, The Hardest Question in Constitutional Law, 81 MINN. L. 
REV. 1 (1997) (examining the possibility of this sort of constitutional failure); Keith E. 
Whittington, Yet Another Constitutional Crisis, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2093 (2001) 
(same). 
 104. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 105. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
 106. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 107. See Rogers M. Smith, The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse:  A 
Diagnosis and Prescription, in INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 218 (Ian Shapiro & Robert 
Adams eds., 1998) (examining the possibility of an extraordinary judicial prerogative 
power). 
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authoritative in constitutional interpretation, not subsequent judicial 
decisions that sought to apply the Constitution.  Likewise, I argue above 
that judicial doctrines and doctrinal analysis might be useful from an 
originalist perspective in conveying the accumulated understanding of 
judges on what the Constitution means and how it should be applied, and in 
assisting judges in administering constitutional rules for purposes of day-to-
day legal adjudication.  But originalist theory does not necessarily resolve 
the question of whether judicial precedent should be taken as an 
authoritative source of law that might supplement or trump the 
constitutional text.  Originalist theory, as such, also does not definitively 
instruct judges on what they should do if they find themselves confronted 
with a legal and political status quo that already departs substantially from 
the original meaning of the constitutional text. 
The potential tensions between judicial precedent and original meaning 
are only of academic interest if the body of constitutional law can be 
reconciled with the original meaning of the Constitution.  Some potential 
conflicts may not matter if the relevant issues are unlikely to be raised in 
justiciable cases, or if the questions are no longer politically salient.  The 
possibility of significant and salient conflicts between received judicial 
doctrine and apparent constitutional original meaning, however, can hardly 
be avoided entirely.  Few would expect that originalism in practice would 
simply validate the constitutional status quo in all its various parts and 
details.  Originalists have proposed a range of possible responses to this 
situation.  For some, judicial precedents should be held in high esteem and 
current judges should normally defer to past decisions, even when they 
would be decided differently as matters of first impression.  In an otherwise 
sympathetic account of originalism, Monaghan concluded “original 
understanding must give way in the face of transformative or longstanding 
precedent.”108  For others, a consequentialist approach to normative theory 
would suggest a potentially intermediate position in which “precedent 
doctrine should consist of rules that require precedent to be followed when 
doing so would produce net benefits.”109  By contrast, Gary Lawson has 
offered a more radical approach to precedent, concluding that a “court may 
properly use precedent if, but only if, the precedent is the best available 
evidence of the right answer to constitutional questions.”110  Arbitrating 
among such alternatives depends both on the pragmatics of judging in an 
imperfect world and on the proper relationship between originalist 
constitutional interpretation and the sources of constitutional law. 
 
 108. Monaghan, supra note 37, at 724; see also BORK, supra note 5, at 155–59. 
 109. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and 
Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 804 (2009); see also Lee J. Strang, An Originalist 
Theory of Precedent:  Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent and the Common Good, 36 
N.M. L. REV. 419 (2006). 
 110. Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional:  The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 
AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 4 (2007); see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 168–74; Randy E. 
Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning:  Not As Radical As It Sounds, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005). 
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There are also practical issues of applying originalist theory that remain 
unresolved.  Many recommendations about how best to pursue originalist 
constitutional interpretation in particular contexts no doubt operate below 
the level of theory, though best practices are likely to continue to emerge 
through concrete efforts to understand constitutional provisions.  Theory is 
more likely to be relevant to some basic methodological issues.  How 
authoritative are the particular interpretive methods and frameworks that 
were in place at the time of the Founding for later originalist interpreters?  
Are original interpretive methods also embodied in the Constitution, or are 
they dispensable features of a historic legal practice?111  Are legal canons 
from the Founding era entrenched along with the constitutional text and 
essential to forming a coherent original understanding of the text?112  How 
should the common law background of the constitutional text be 
interpreted?113  How should common background assumptions of the 
Founding period be incorporated into the interpretation of the constitutional 
text?114  Such issues have only begun to be explored in earnest. 
Uncertainty and indeterminacy are inherent in the originalist approach to 
constitutional interpretation.  The evidence of the historical meaning of 
particular provisions of the constitutional text may often be inadequate to 
guide the modern interpreter.  Constitutional provisions may have been 
vague in their original usage, leaving uncertainty about how they should be 
clarified or elaborated.  The law may have gaps that do not adequately 
guide political actors, even when action is necessary.  Such considerations 
suggest that there are limits to what constitutional interpretation can 
accomplish.115 
Originalists differ among themselves on how best to respond to this 
uncertainty.  One recent option has been to supplement originalist 
constitutional interpretation with nonoriginalist constitutional 
construction.116  Constitutional construction characterizes the constitutional 
elaboration within the interstices of the discoverable meaning of the 
constitutional text.  Constructions perform important work by filling in gaps 
of constitutional meaning and providing guidance for how political actors 
should behave when original constitutional meaning is indeterminate.  The 
process of construction allows political actors to depart from known 
constitutional meaning without violating constitutional meaning.  Within 
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the “construction zone” of indeterminate constitutional meaning, political 
actors creatively assemble new constitutional rules.117 
Although embraced by some, the idea of constitutional construction has 
not been universally accepted by advocates of originalism, and the 
elaboration of the idea has not always been consistent among those who 
endorse it.  Some would emphasize that constructions should primarily be 
pursued by political actors, while others suggest that courts should routinely 
engage in significant constructions of constitutional meaning in order to 
limit political actors.118  Of course, one possible response to the idea of 
constructions is to deny that the meaning of the constitutional text is ever 
indeterminate or that there is significant uncertainty in constitutional 
interpretation.  Perhaps all significant indeterminacies can be resolved 
through sufficiently careful efforts at interpretation.  This, however, seems 
improbable.  A more credible response is to suggest that there are other 
options for addressing interpretive uncertainty other than construction.  One 
such option would suggest that a plethora of default rules could guide 
constitutional interpreters in the face of uncertainty.  A particularly 
prominent default rule would be a rule that judges should defer to 
legislators on disputed constitutional questions whenever constitutional 
meaning is unclear.  Rather than attempting to construct an effective 
constitutional rule on their own, judges encountering indeterminacies in the 
discoverable meaning of the Constitution might simply determine that, for 
example, the actions of government officials should be upheld against 
contested rights claims or that state authority should be upheld against the 
contested actions of Congress.119  It remains to be seen whether such 
options are sustainable as alternatives to the idea of constitutional 
constructions or whether constructions will occupy a significant space 
within originalist theory. 
III.  POINTS OF SEPARATION 
There has been greater convergence between originalists and 
nonoriginalists in recent years than when the originalism debates first 
began.120  Whereas the early originalists were particularly concerned with 
drawing contrasts between themselves and their critics, more recent 
offerings in originalism have emphasized points of commonality between 
originalist and nonoriginalist theories (and, in fact, have found more 
common ground with nonoriginalists).  At the same time, critics of 
originalism have emphasized concerns with constitutional interpretation and 
 
 117. See Solum, supra note 115, at 108. 
 118. Compare BARNETT, supra note 72, at 118–30, with WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 
6–13. 
 119. Default rules are considered in greater detail in Whittington, supra note 115, at 130–
33. 
 120. I wish it went without saying that I do not believe that constitutional theory can 
simply be reduced to this particular dichotomy between originalists and nonoriginalists.  
There are a wide variety of approaches to constitutional theory beyond the confines of 
originalism (and much disagreement among originalists), but for present purposes what is of 
interest is the unity of other schools of thought in their criticism of originalism. 
2013] ORIGINALISM:  A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 405 
historical meaning in ways that help bridge the gulf between them and 
originalists. 
Despite this growing common ground, there remain some notable points 
of separation between originalists and their critics.  There are still features 
of originalist theory that remain unpalatable to nonoriginalists, and vice 
versa.  Originalists and nonoriginalists continue to build their normative 
theories on distinct foundations and reach incompatible results.  Even as we 
try to clarify the points of agreement and contestation within the recent 
originalist literature, it is worth bearing in mind what continues to separate 
originalists from their critics and prevents an easy reconciliation.  I 
highlight two broad points of continued separation. 
The first point of separation is that originalists remain far more optimistic 
than their critics about how discernible or useful original meaning might be.  
This is ultimately less of a theoretical disagreement than a practical one.  
One can fully accept every feature of originalist theory, and yet still 
conclude as an empirical matter that the particular constitution that one 
seeks to interpret is largely indeterminate and vague—or at least is 
indeterminate and vague relative to most of the legal issues that we happen 
to find most salient.  The original meaning of a text may be hopelessly lost 
to us because the text in question is frustratingly vague, because the 
historical evidence that might clarify its meaning is irredeemably corrupt or 
missing, or for a variety of other reasons.  For those who are pessimistic 
about the recoverability of the original meaning of the constitutional text, 
the proper response would lean less towards thinking that originalism is 
flawed and more towards thinking that originalism is necessarily irrelevant 
to contemporary constitutional practice. 
There are three notes to be made regarding this point of separation 
between originalists and their critics.  First, while it is reasonable enough to 
be skeptical about the ultimate value of an originalist inquiry for resolving 
immediate constitutional disputes, such pessimism should ultimately be 
supported by historical research.  It is thus an empirical question whether 
originalist efforts at interpretation of any given piece of text bear any fruit.  
Both those who are optimistic about the value of originalist interpretation 
and those who are pessimistic would do well to wait until the research has 
been done before drawing any firm conclusions about how useful originalist 
admonishments might be. 
Second, when considering the possible utility of originalist interpretation 
for resolving contemporary disputes, pessimists should bear in mind that the 
relevant inquiry is into the original meaning of constitutional rules, not into 
the historically expected applications of the textually embodied rule.  
Expected applications are likely to become obsolete relatively quickly, not 
because those inferences about the implications of the adopted rule are 
likely to be flawed, but because the application of the rule to political 
debates is likely to be narrow and time bound.  The drafted text might itself 
take such an obsolescent character.  The particular fears of the Founding 
generation led to the constitutional entrenchment of items such as the right 
to a jury trial in civil cases involving more than twenty dollars and the 
406 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
prohibition on titles of nobility.  As Richard Primus has emphasized, 
constitutional rights and prohibitions are often the product of particular 
political conflicts and experiences.121  The United States is relatively 
fortunate that the drafters of the Constitution tended to frame the rules 
somewhat abstractly, such that the Third Amendment is the exception rather 
than the rule.  Many of our constitutional rules may have grown out of the 
Founders’ particular historical experiences, but the rules themselves 
generally have broad implications for situations that the Founders never 
imagined.122 
Third, if originalist interpretive efforts prove fruitless, there still remains 
the question of what is to be done in the face of such textual indeterminacy.  
As we have seen, originalists disagree among themselves on this point.  
Some would no doubt fall into the same camp as many critics of originalism 
when considering what courts or political actors should do when the 
original meaning of a constitutional provision runs out.  Whether in such 
circumstances judges should creatively generate rules of their own or defer 
to the actions of elected officials is beyond the scope of a theory of 
originalism per se and turns on a broader set of normative issues about the 
scope of judicial power and how to govern in the face of constitutional 
indeterminacy.  The pessimist may simply believe that we more often find 
ourselves in the “construction zone” than most originalists do. 
The second important point of separation between originalists and their 
critics is a theoretical one that goes to the heart of originalist theory:  a 
disagreement over how authoritative original meaning should be.  
Specifically, this disagreement centers on Solum’s “fixation” and 
“contribution” theses, and whether the meaning of a term is fixed at the 
time that it is uttered, constraining the content of constitutional law.  To 
adhere to originalism necessarily requires adherence to those key features of 
the theory, and these are features that still provoke objections from critics of 
originalism, no matter how capacious such a theory of originalism might 
be.123 
There are a variety of concerns about originalism that might be grouped 
under this heading.  Broadly speaking, we might think that the original 
meaning is only one component of the effective law.  From this perspective, 
the original meaning of the Constitution might be one factor to consider 
when attempting to determine what the applicable law might be for 
resolving a particular dispute, but the original meaning is not a hard 
constraint on the formulation of a rule to be applied.  Original meaning 
might be one source of constitutional law, but it has no pride of place.  The 
development of constitutional law might not be the equivalent of 
 
 121. RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS (1999). 
 122. The concern that constitutional provisions may be framed or conceptualized so 
narrowly that they have few implications outside their own context is distinct from a concern 
that historically generated constitutional provisions may no longer seem like the correct rules 
with which to govern. 
 123. This is why Dworkin ultimately could not embrace even his own reconstructed 
version of originalism. Dworkin, supra note 57, at 1258 n.18. 
2013] ORIGINALISM:  A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 407 
interpretation of the constitutional text, but may instead be a broader, more 
wide-ranging process.  Original meaning might therefore be integrated into 
or balanced within the larger web of legal sources that must be considered 
when attempting to ascertain the applicable constitutional rule. 
Whether from a Dworkinian law-as-integrity perspective or a 
constitutional pluralism perspective, we might think that judicial doctrine or 
ideas of social justice have as much role in determining the content of the 
law as the original meaning of the text as understood by those who laid 
down that text.  Is judicial precedent, for example, as authoritative as the 
original meaning of the text in determining what the constitutional rules 
might be?  If precedents are as authoritative (or more so) than the original 
meaning of the text, is this true only of particularly celebrated landmark 
decisions or would it be equally true of run-of-the-mill judicial decisions?  
Although such arguments might be pitched as critiques of the fixation thesis 
(must the text mean what it originally meant?), they are perhaps more 
telling when aimed at the contribution thesis (is constitutional law 
determined by the original meaning of the text?).  Is original meaning one 
factor to be considered when identifying the constitutional rule; is original 
meaning just one data point to be weighed in the balance with other, 
potentially contradictory considerations?  For originalists, the original 
meaning must be a hard constraint on how constitutional law can develop.  
For many nonoriginalists, the original meaning is simply one piece of 
information to consider in determining how law should develop. 
Critics of originalism have suggested a range of considerations that might 
trump original meaning if the two were to come into conflict.  From this 
perspective, fidelity to original meaning is not the chief goal of 
constitutional theory.  For originalists, the original meaning is the trump 
card and could not be appropriately overridden by other considerations 
when seeking to interpret the Constitution.  For nonoriginalists, original 
meaning may be important, but it is hardly a trump card—nor is the 
discernment of original meaning the primary goal of constitutional 
interpretation.  We might imagine, for example, that a concern with good 
outcomes should trump original meaning.  While it might be useful to 
determine what a constitutional provision originally meant, the interpreter 
should perhaps keep one eye on the likely effects of such a reading of the 
constitutional text and, if necessary, make some adjustments.  To borrow a 
phrase, critics of originalism might be “faint-hearted.”124  Confronted with 
suitably unpleasant results, the nonoriginalist might posit that the original 
meaning should be sacrificed.  Alternatively, we might think that 
contemporary public opinion should trump original meaning.  
 
 124. Scalia, supra note 2, at 862.  As with Scalia himself, the implication here is not that 
the fainthearted are cowardly, but simply that they regard the medicine as sometimes “too 
strong to swallow.” Id. at 861.  Scalia suggested that even originalists should make some 
concessions to political and social reality.  We might instead think that constitutional theory 
should be consequentialist and should appropriately reject an approach that tends, in general 
or in specific cases, to produce unpalatable results, or that constitutional theory should be a 
moral enterprise concerned with generating rules that reflect true claims about the political 
good. 
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Contemporary public opinion might be an independent source of law, or it 
might be situated within a theory of constitutional legitimacy in which the 
authoritative constitutional rules are those that can command respect and 
assent from the current populace, regardless of their pedigree. 
Underlying all these considerations is a view that courts are authorized to 
impose constitutional rules other than those adopted by the constitutional 
drafters.  This returns to the question of whether courts are limited to 
constitutional interpretation or whether they may exercise the power of 
judicial review on other grounds.  Originalists disagree among themselves 
on this question, but the disagreement with nonoriginalists is more 
particular.  An originalist might accept that courts can operate with some 
discretion within the boundaries set by the discoverable meaning of the 
Constitution, and that they can construct doctrine that is not dictated by 
constitutional interpretation so long as it does not conflict with 
constitutional interpretation.  The crucial point of disagreement with 
nonoriginalists must be with whether courts may also exercise discretion to 
construct doctrine that does conflict with the original meaning of the 
Constitution.  The originalist need not conclude that judges must stay their 
hand when they reach points of constitutional indeterminacy, but the 
originalist must insist that judges not close their eyes to the discoverable 
meaning of the Constitution and announce some other constitutional rule to 
supersede it.125  It is at that point that the originalist and the nonoriginalist 
must part ways. 
CONCLUSION 
To borrow from Daniel Farber, “It is not my purpose in this essay to 
convert readers to my own view about originalism.”126  I have staked out 
positions of my own within the originalism debate, and, of course, I am 
fond of them.127  My goal here, however, is to survey the terrain at this 
point in the originalism debate.  A great deal of work has been done since 
the first wave of the originalism debate.  Originalists developed arguments 
and came to prominence in the 1970s and 1980s, but the number of 
participants in that theory-building exercise was relatively few and the 
central concerns of their arguments were rather immediate and political.  
Those advocates of originalism were met with a substantial response.  Over 
 
 125. Again, there are qualifications to be added here to address extraordinary 
circumstances or entrenched precedents, to which originalists might disagree on how to 
respond.  But significantly, in such circumstances the authority for judicial action would rest 
explicitly on noninterpretive grounds.  Judges would take action in a crisis because such 
action was necessary, or judges would adhere to doctrine because such adherence is required 
by considerations of fairness and good order.  While the worry about precedent from an 
originalist perspective is that the exception might swallow the rule, the points of separation 
between theories are not best measured by the exceptions.  The interesting gap between 
originalists and their critics is not on how doctrinal mistakes should be corrected, for the 
doctrine that originalists would regard as mistakes might be embraced and exalted by the 
nonoriginalist. 
 126. Farber, supra note 14, at 1104. 
 127. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 20. 
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the past decade or so, another round of originalist theory has emerged.  This 
second wave of theorizing has often (though not entirely) been advanced by 
a new generation of advocates, and has generally had a lower political 
profile and stronger academic orientation.  While this new originalism 
shares many features of the old, there are some significant differences, and 
the contours of the current version of originalist theory should be properly 
recognized. 
There remain important differences and issues that are subject to debate 
among originalists.  It is hard to imagine how the situation could be any 
different, absent reducing originalist theory to the views of a single 
canonical figure or organizing a political movement concerned with 
generating a manifesto.  Those who engage in originalist theory come to the 
topic from a range of substantive concerns, normative commitments, and 
ideological angles.  Even so, this second wave of originalism seems to have 
settled on a set of commonalities, even as a number of issues important to 
the theory of originalism remain internally contested.  Today, originalism is 
clearer on the centrality of the public meaning of the constitutional text and 
more agnostic about the importance of judicial restraint than it once was.  
The rationales for originalism and relationship between originalist 
constitutional interpretation and the exercise of judicial review remain 
matters of continued disagreement.  If these adjustments have brought 
originalist theory closer to the views of many of its critics, there remain 
important points of separation between originalism and other approaches to 
constitutional theory.  The questions of how important constitutional 
interpretation should be to the development of constitutional law and 
whether we should remain bound to the Founders’ text are, I believe, central 
to the continuing disagreement between originalists and their critics. 
